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Department of Business Policy, Faculty of Business Administration, National University of 
Singapore. l0 Kent Ridge Crescent, Singapore 0511 
(Received 13 April 1992: in revised form 25 February 1993) 
A b s t r a c t - T h i s  paper reviews the developments since the vehicle quota system was introduced in 
Singapore in May 1990. We discuss the bidding strategies for the certificates of entitlement (COE) 
under both the transferable and nontransferable auctions, as well as the equity of the present 
system and the desirability of transferable COEs. We argue that the COE auction should be made 
discriminatory and propose  an alternative system of COE auction that we feel is both equitable 
and at the same time politically acceptable. We also survey developments in market competition 
in the car industry. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 1, 1990, the Singapore government implemented a vehicle quota system to 
control the growth in the vehicle population. This is in addition to a menu of  taxes 
already in existence to curb the demand for private transportation. The vehicle quota 
system is the first of  its kind to be implemented in the world, and the Singapore experience 
is useful to other countries who are seriously trying to tackle the problem of road conges- 
tion. 
Under the vehicle quota system, a new vehicle can only be allowed on the road if its 
owner has obtained a certificate of  entitlement (COE). Since August 1990 these have 
been auctioned monthly, through a sealed-bid tender. Exemptions under the quota system 
are made for the following types of  vehicles: scheduled buses, school buses, emergency 
vehicles, trailers, diplomatic vehicles, and vehicles for the disabled. When it was first 
implemented, the quota system comprised seven car categories so that bidders could be 
segmented into different groups based on intended car purchase. These categories are 
based primarily on engine capacity and intended car usage: Category i, small cars (1000 
cc and below); Category 2, medium cars (1000-1600 cc) and taxis (with no restriction on 
engine capacities); Category 3, big cars (1601-2000 cc); Category 4, luxury cars (2001 and 
above); Category 5, goods vehicles/buses; Category 6, motorcycles; and Category 7, 
open category. COEs in the open category are used to buy any type of vehicles, unlike 
COEs in the other categories. An eighth category, the weekend car, was added in July 
1991, in response to public demand to make car ownership more affordable. Weekend 
cars can only be used during off-peak hours, from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m. during weekdays, 
from 1 p.m. on Saturdays, Sundays, and public holidays. 
The vehicle quotas are determined as follows. Every year, the government announces 
a rate of  growth for the vehicle population, based on prevailing traffic conditions and 
road capacity. This is then used to determine the quota for individual categories, account- 
ing for the existing vehicle population and the number of vehicles deregistered at the end 
of  the preceding year. To allow for personal preferences and some leeway in the mix of 
vehicles under the quota system, 25°/0 of the deregistered vehicles in each category are 
pooled into the open category, with the remaining 75°70 being kept in their respective 
categories. 
To limit speculation, bidders for COEs are allowed only one sealed bid each and it 
must be in multiples of  S$1 (US$1 = S$1.65). Bidders are also required to deposit half 
their bids with the Registry of Vehicles (ROV). They can submit their bids either on 
forms available from the ROV, at a cost of  50 cents each, or, more recently, through 
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automated teller machines (ATMs) using their bank cards. The COE premium in each 
auction is determined by the lowest successful bid and all successful bidders pay the same 
COE premium. Unsuccessful bidders are refunded their deposits. Successful bidders are 
required to exercise their entitlement by buying the vehicle or transferring the COE to 
another party within a specified period, if the COE is transferable. Failure to exercise the 
COE results in forfeiture of  the deposits, and the unused COEs are then added to the 
quota for the next monthly auction. 
A vehicle purchased under the quota system is allowed on the road for 10 years. If 
an owner wishes to keep the vehicle on the road for another 10 years, he or she must pay 
a quota premium to extend ownership for another 10 years, or half the quota premium 
for an extension of  5 years. Thereafter,  no renewals are allowed. The quota premium, 
calculated as the 12-month moving average of  COE premium, also applies to vehicles 
registered before the system was in place. A 2-year grace period was given to vehicles that 
were more than 8 years old when the quota system was introduced in May 1990. 
The first COE auction was held in April 1990; the validity period of  the first batch 
of  COEs was 6 months, from May 1990 to October 1990. The government had originally 
intended to conduct COE auctions on a quarterly basis. In response to suggestions by the 
public that the auctions should be more frequent in order to curb speculation, the govern- 
ment decided to conduct the auctions on a monthly basis from the second auction (August 
1990) onward. The validity period of the COEs was correspondingly reduced to 3 months. 
Before October 1991, COEs in all categories were transferable once. Car distributors, 
who were allowed 30 bids during each auction, could only transfer the COES to their 
customers. These are additional measures to limit speculation. However, stories abound 
of  huge profits being earned by big-time speculators, who turned out to be used-car 
dealers (The Straits Times, various issues). Responding to public outcry to eliminate 
speculation, the government decided that from October 1, 1991 onward, COEs in six car 
categories out of eight become nontransferable. COEs in the Goods Vehicles and Buses 
category and the open category remain transferable. The validity period of  nontransfer- 
able COEs has also been increased to 6 months. 
Until September 1992, 15 transferable COE auctions and 12 nontransferable COE 
auctions have taken place. (The COE premia and the corresponding quotas are given in 
Table 1.) It is evident from Table 1 that COE prices showed marked fluctuations. The 
wildly fluctuating COE prices had been a source of  much unhappiness for car buyers and 
distributors. While part of  the fluctuation must have been due to the different levels of  
demands in each auction, the public had blamed the rapidly increasing COE prices, in 
the 6 months following the Gulf  War, on rampant speculation. 
Many people had argued that the speculator, by placing arbitrarily high bids, outbid 
the genuine bidders (i.e., those who did not intend to resell) who, not to be outbid, were 
in turn compelled to put in higher bids or buy at much higher prices in the secondary 
market. Car buyers also complained that they lacked market information to make a 
successful bid against distributors and speculators. The large secondary market in COEs 
was evident from the fact that until April 1991, out of the 32,000 vehicles registered with 
transferable COEs, only 5100 or 16°'/0 of  the buyers submitted COEs which were won in 
their own name. The majority (84°/o) bought COEs from the secondary market or from 
distributors, who bid on their behalf or offered discounted COEs as part of  the sales 
package. 
Car distributors blamed speculation for playing havoc with their sales. Many were 
reportedly just grabbing as many COEs as they could to sell their cars. Since car distribu- 
tors were entitled to bid for only 30 COEs a month (before October 1991) although they 
sell 100 or more cars each month, many of  them resorted to bidding by proxy, using the 
names of their employees and relatives of  their employees. Also, distributors who offered 
discounted COEs to promote sales often had to buy COEs in the secondary market when 
response was better than expected. When resale prices of COEs went up, these car dealers 
ended up with only a small profit from selling cars. Many distributors, especially those 
selling the cheaper makes, found their profit margins squeezed. Some inferior car makes 
have already disappeared from the market. 
Vehicle quota system 
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Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Category 7 
Small Medium Big Luxury Open 
May 1990 Premium 
Quota 
Aug 1990 Premium 
Quota 
Sep 1990 Premium 
Quota 
Oct 1990 Premium 
Quota 
Nov 1990 Premium 
Quota 
Dec 1990 Premium 
Quota 
Jan 1 9 9 1  Premium 
Quota 
Feb 1 9 9 1  Premium 
Quota 
Mar 1 9 9 1  Premium 
Quota 
Apr 1 9 9 1  Premium 
Quota 
May 1991  Premium 
Quota 
Jun 1 9 9 1  Prem,um 
Quota 
Jul 1 9 9 1  Premium 
Quota 
Aug 1 9 9 1  Premium 
Quota 
Sep 1 9 9 1  Premium 
Quota 
Oct 1991" Premium 
Quota 
Nov 1991" Premium 
Quota 
Dec 1991 * Premium 
Quota 
Jan 1992" Premium 
Quota 
Feb 1992" Premium 
Quota 
Feb 1992" Premium 
Quota 
Mar 1992" Premium 
Quota 
Apr 1992" Premium 
Quota 
May 1992" Premium 
Quota 
Jun 1992" Premium 
Quota 
Jul 1992" Premium 
Quota 
Aug 1992" Premium 
Quota 
Sep 1992" Premium 
Quota 
Oct 1992" Premium 
Quota 
1,004 3,002 5,001 528 3,376 
986 4.583 857 270 1,400 
2,080 6,012 7,238 4,550 7,750 
304 1.416 265 88 467 
5.030 9.888 1 I. 1 04 5.602 7.400 
306 1,420 269 88 472 
5,612 7.220 10,400 5,886 11,100 
306 1,507 305 88 468 
3.102 2.004 1,120 1.502 5,002 
278 1,287 254 76 472 
2,001 3,202 4,000 2,002 3,170 
277 1,290 258 77 511 
2.006 3.224 3.600 2.004 3.410 
301 !.365 255 82 471 
210 2,649 3,001 988 2,508 
251 1,167 217 77 467 
652 909 210 1,004 998 
251 1,164 236 70 470 
1.202 1.904 1.420 800 1.638 
256 1.170 218 74 468 
4.510 5.258 5.610 3.020 6.062 
228 1,396 218 59 480 
7,002 7,875 11,020 I 0,000 9,012 
247 1,372 216 63 497 
7,004 8,002 9,178 12,047 11,171 
234 1,375 252 68 489 
9,660 9,040 12.558 12,742 12.368 
273 1,482 216 60 479 
9,508 10.520 13.080 13,000 12,488 
206 1,373 221 61 478 
6,300 6,528 10,002 12,002 12,222 
200 1,378 222 59 476 
7.500 9.188 12.002 13.004 14.337 
199 1.400 229 83 486 
9,616 12,958 14,800 16,788 16,738 
205 1,459 252 85 488 
10,100 16,602 18,500 19,666 18,080 
238 1,388 262 75 611 
9,002 I 1,000 20,002 16,080 18,104 
204 1,382 227 78 517 
9,002 11,000 20,002 16,080 18,1 04 
204 1.382 227 78 517 
12.160 I 0.406 16.1(30 17.600 18.587 
204 1.382 227 78 517 
15.000 14.958 19.739 20.037 20.228 
237 1.385 218 65 486 
17.300 20.542 24.798 25.108 25.002 
201 1.314 224 61 518 
17.200 20.500 30,002 32,898 31.888 
181 1,316 215 60 607 
13,690 18,994 24,758 24,828 23,870 
183 1,317 227 68 504 
13.060 19,510 20,998 21,008 24,018 
183 1,321 229 60 508 
I 5.004 20.741 24.118 1.500 25.060 
183 1.323 221 65 513 
17.020 22.888 10.002 20.982 26.010 
179 1,302 216 58 496 
*Nontransferable COE for Categories I to 4. 
Source: Registry of Vehicles (Singapore). 
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Most distributors then feared that if the situation continued, they would have to 
raise car prices more frequently, because their profit  margins were being rapidly eroded 
by the high subsidies they gave for COEs. Distributors, however, felt that the COE 
subsidies were necessary because car buyers were reluctant to pay the high resale prices 
quoted by speculators. Distributors have also sought to pass back part of  the cost of  the 
subsidies to the car buyer in the form of  higher car prices, more expensive spare parts, 
and optional extras. Although COEs became nontransferable after October 1, 1991, 
dealers continued to subsidize COEs by as much as 50°70 to 100070. This has encouraged 
car buyers to put in higher bids since the effective price they would have to pay, should 
they be successful, would be much less. 
Nontransferabil i ty in the six COE categories had also not entirely eliminated bidding 
by proxy. Car distributors continued to submit bids by proxy and register cars under 
their employees '  names when they managed to obtain the COEs. These cars were then 
sold as second-hand cars, with a letter from the distributor certifying that the second 
owner was in effect the first owner. This practice of  double transfer (transferring both 
car and COE) to get around the nontransferability of  COEs has led to more intense 
market  competi t ion among car distributors. Furthermore,  used-car dealers continued 
their profitable trade of speculating in COEs via double transfers. The impact of  the 
vehicle quota system on the car distributorship industry in Singapore is analyzed in Koh 
and Leung (1993). 
We address several questions relating to the efficiency and equity of  the COE auction 
system currently practised in Singapore. First, would a nontransferable auction lead to 
lower COE prices, as the public has argued? Are there alternative systems that would 
curb speculation as well? Second, is the uniform-price auction equitable in allocating the 
COEs? Third, what are the implications of  the vehicle quota system on competition 
within the car industry? 
We review briefly (in Section 2) the rationale for adopting the vehicle quota system. 
In Section 3, we discuss bidding strategies for the COE auctions. We demonstrate that 
the uniform-price transferable auction results in higher COE prices compared with the 
uniform-price nontransferable auction, for the same level of  demand. We discuss the 
equity of  the COE auction and the desirability of  transferable COEs. In Section 4, we 
argue that the COE auction should be made discriminatory. Our basic argument is that 
the COE premium is not a road-user charge but rather a property tax on the ownership 
of  cars. Therefore,  the premium should be based on ability to pay. We also discuss 
whether the discriminatory auction would lead to lower COE prices and whether it is 
politically acceptable. We propose an alternative COE auction system where bids are in 
percentages of  car value which bidders pay as COE premium. In Section 5, we survey 
developments in the car industry since the vehicle quota system was implemented. Ini- 
tially, when COEs were transferable, distributors were mainly concerned with the level of  
subsidies to give to increase sales. When COEs became nontransferable,  distributors 
began competing with one another for market  shares, leading to more aggressive bidding. 
The anticipated drop in COE prices did not materialise. A number of  distributors for less 
expensive car makers were driven from the market .  We conclude with some concluding 
remarks in Section 6. 
2. RATIONALE FOR THE VEHICLE QUOTA SYSTEM 
Singapore is an island nation with a land surface of  about 260 square kilometers, 
situated just above the equator,  at the southern tip of  the Malaysia Peninsula. It has a 
population of about  2.7 million, with a population density of  just over 10,000 persons 
per square kilometres. Currently, the economy grows at about 5°7o to 7% a year, and 
Singaporeans enjoy a per capita gross national product of  about  S$20,000 per year, the 
second highest in Asia after Japan.  As with most urban cities, the demand for private 
transportation is very income elastic in Singapore. It has been calculated (see Chin & 
Koh, 1989) that a 1°70 increase in household income resulted in a 207o increase in the 
number  of  private cars in Singapore. 
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Before the vehicle quota system was implemented, the vehicle population in Singa- 
pore was controlled through a mix of  regulations and taxes. The rationale for controlling 
the vehicle population in a small country like Singapore is obvious: It is to ensure a free 
flow of  traffic, allowing for an optimal degree of congestion. 
From 1960 to 1970, private vehicle population doubled from 70,108 to 142,548. 
During the period, public buses and taxis only increased by about 64°70, while public 
roads were lengthened by 35°70. In 1970, the length of  major  arterial roads was 240 km, a 
paltry increase of  12070 over 1960. With the number of  private cars per km of arterial 
roads rising from 328 in 1961 to 594 in 1970, the traffic condition was fast deteriorating. 
In the 1970s, there was a rapid succession of  increases in annual road taxes and 
registration fees for private cars. The Additional Registration Fee (ARF), payable when a 
vehicle is registered, was increased from 100070 of  the Open Market Value (OMV) of a 
vehicle in 1975 to 15007o in 1980 and 17507o in 1983. The OMV of  a vehicle comprises the 
manufacturer 's  price plus freight and insurance charges. In 1975, the Preferential ARF 
(PARF) scheme was also introduced. Under the PARF scheme, car buyers who trade in a 
car not exceeding 10 years old enjoyed a reduction in the ARF equal to the market scrap 
value of  the old car. The PARF scheme was intended to encourage the replacement of  
old cars and at the same time control the growth of  the population of new vehicles. In 
1991, the PARF reduction was standardised at 80070 of  the OMV. 
The tough measures introduced in the 1970s plus the steep hike in energy prices 
during that period temporarily slowed the growth of  private car ownership. However, in 
the 1980s, substantial increases in the per capita income and the rapid expansion of  urban 
areas led to a rapid increase in private car ownership. The number of  persons per private 
car decreased from 15.8 in 1980 to 11.6 in 1985. 
The rapid increase in car ownership led the government to consider using a quota 
system as an alternative measure to control the increase in the vehicle population. As a 
policy measure, it is definitely superior to the use of  the ARFs and road taxes, since the 
actual growth of the vehicle population is determined by the level of  car supply. It is with 
this in mind that the government introduced the vehicle quota system on May 1, 1990. 
3. OPTIMAL BIDDING STRATEGY IN THE COE AUCTIONS 
Research in auction theory (see Milgrom & Weber, 1982 or Riley & Samuelson, 
1981) showed that in a uniform-price auction where successful bidders pay the highest 
rejected bid, the optimal bidding strategy is to bid what one is willing to pay. The basic 
argument is as follows: Bidding arbitrarily higher than one's willingness to pay increases 
the probability of  winning but may result in the bidder having to pay a price higher than 
what he or she is willing to pay, leading to a negative consumer surplus. Bidding lower, 
on the other hand, reduces the probability of  winning but does not increase the bidder's 
consumer surplus when he or she is successful. 
In the COE auctions in Singapore, successful bidders pay the lowest successful bid, 
so the optimal strategy is not to bid one's willingness to pay (which is roughly equal to 
the net benefits of  convenience, time savings, and status one enjoys from owning a car) 
but slightly lower. In the event that a bidder is the lowest successful bidder, he or she will 
still enjoy some consumer surplus. We describe a model of  the COE auction. For simplic- 
ity, we suppose that successful bidders pay the highest rejected bid, so that bidders bid 
their willingness to pay. If the number of  bidders is large, the bid distribution would be 
approximately continuous, so the lowest successful bid will be close to the highest rejected 
bid. Therefore,  the qualitative properties of  the optimal bidding strategies under both 
systems would be similar. 
Consider a COE auction where n bidders compete for k COEs in a particular cate- 
gory, with k < n. The number of  COEs available in each category, announced in ad- 
vance, is public knowledge. Each bidder has some private information that affects his or 
her willingness to pay. For the car buyer, this is his or her urgency to own a car. If  the 
bidder has decided to bid for a COE now rather than buy one from the secondary market 
nearer the time when the car is delivered, his or her private information would also 
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include forecasts about COE prices for the current exercise as well as future resale COE 
prices. For a speculator who is only interested in resale, his or her private information 
would be about the levels of  demand in the resale market .  For distributors who need 
COEs to sell cars, their private information would be the forecast COE prices, future 
resale prices as well as their profit  margins. 
If  COEs are transferable, each bidder's valuation comprises a private value, that 
reflects the worth of  the COE for the purpose of  car purchase or car sale, and a common 
value, that reflects the resale value of  the COEs. For the speculator, there is only the 
common-value component ,  since he or she is only interested in resale. If  the COEs are 
nontransferable,  there would be no speculators, and personal valuations are only private 
values. 
We represent bidders' private information by X = (Xt . . . . .  X,), the components 
are summary  values of  the bidders'  private signals. A larger X~ indicates greater willing- 
ness to pay and /or  higher expected resale COE prices, or both. Besides private informa- 
tion, bidders have access to public information,  such as interest rates, COE resale prices 
and government policies that affect demand for COEs. Let S be a value estimate of  these 
public signals that influence bidders'  valuations when they submit bids. Additional public 
information may be available after bidding has closed but before the secondary market 
opens. Let P be a value estimate of  these ex-post public signals. An example of  an ex-post 
public signal is an announcement to release 10,000 extra COEs in the coming year, as the 
Singapore government did in May 1992. 
If  each bidder has access to the other bidders' private information,  the value of the 
COE to bidder i, denoted It, (in monetary units), is a function of  S, P and X, as follows: 
v, = u( s ,  e ,  x .  {xjb.,) (l) 
The function U implies that every bidder's valuation depends on S and P identically. 
Each bidder's valuation is also a symmetric function of  other bidders' signals. A bidder's 
valuation may depend on other bidders' private information since the other bidders may 
have access to different (perhaps better) information about resale prices, future COE 
prices and government policies regarding the quantity and timing of release of  COEs in 
future auctions. 
Of  course, each bidder cannot observe the private information of the other bidders; 
the best he or she can do is form estimates of  their private information.  Let YI . . . . .  
YL . . . .  Y~_ ~ denote bidder l 's estimates of  the largest to smallest private signals among 
the other bidders, so that we should write V~ = U(S, P, Xi, { Y~,}k~J . . . . . . .  ,) instead. We 
assume that bidders are risk neutral. If  a bidder obtains a COE and pays the amount  b, 
he or she gains V~ - b. 
From a bidder's point of  view before an auction, S, P and X, except for X~, are 
drawn randomly by nature from a distribution of  possible values. Let f(s, p, x) be the 
joint density function of  the random variables, where [s-,s ÷] × [P-,P*I x [x-,x*l ~ is 
the support  o f f .  We assume that f(s,p,x) is symmetric in its last n arguments,  and that 
the random variables are affiliated (see Milgrom & Weber, 1982, for a detailed defini- 
tion). Roughly speaking, we are assuming that each bidder believes (or acts as if) large 
values for some variables make the other variables more likely to have large values than 
small values. This means that if a bidder is willing to submit higher bids in view of  higher 
expected demands, he or she should think that other bidders are also prepared to do so. 
If  he or she forecasts a high COE price, then it is more likely that other bidders'  forecasts 
would also be high rather than low. 
Transferable COE auction 
Since the bidding environment is symmetric,  a common optimal bidding strategy 
b*(X) exists. To solve for b*(X), suppose bidders i = 2 . . . . .  n bid b*(X). To win a 
COE, bidder 1 must forecast the COE price (the highest rejected bid) in the current 
auction. His forecast is in fact b*(Y~), where y,t (the superscript I will henceforth be 
suppressed) is his k'th highest estimate of  the other bidders' signals. To win a COE, he 
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must submit a bid b greater than b*(YO. If  he turns out to be successful, for how much 
would he be willing to sell the COE in the secondary market? When the auction has 
taken place, additional public information in the form of  P is available, so, intuitively, 
bidder 1 would base his asking price on the revised valuation of  the COE, given P and 
the fact that b > b*(YD. Formally, the revised valuation is 
r " (Yk ,p )  ~_ EIV,  l b * - ' ( b  ) ~_ Y~,Y,,P] (2) 
where the superscript u denotes the uniform-price auction, and the dependence on XK is 
suppressed. Thus, his asking price, i f  he is successful, is conditional on the estimate Yk 
and the public signal P, which is unobservable when bids were submitted. Taking an 
expectation over P, bidder l 's expected or forecast asking price, denoted v"(Xt, Y~) is a 
function of  his own private signal X~ and the estimate Y,, since he must submit a bid 
greater than b*(Yk): 
v"(x,y) =- E [ r " ( Y k , P ) I X ,  = x, Y, = y] (3) 
By affiliation, v"(x,y) is increasing in x and y (i.e., the higher the bidder's private signal, 
the higher will be his expectation of  the resale price). 
For the car buyer or the car distributor, the forecast asking price is the amount he 
needs to be compensated if he were to give up the COE if he is successful. This amount is 
precisely what he would be willing to pay to purchase a COE from the secondary market,  
should he fail to win a COE. For 
COE prices in the secondary market ,  
Therefore,  bidders' valuations before 
are linked to COE resale prices. After  
is r"( rk, P). 
The forecast asking price is the 
transferable COE auction. Given his 
maximize expected consumer surplus. 
the speculator, resale profit  depends on forecast 
which in turn determines his forecast asking price. 
the a u c t i o n - t h e  forecast asking prices vU(X~, Y , ) -  
the auction has taken place, each bidder's valuation 
relevant valuation when bids are submitted in the 
forecast asking price, bidder I chooses a bid b to 
We prove in Appendix A the following result: 
Proposition 1: b*(x) - v"(x,x) where v"(x,y) ~= EIr"(Y,,P)IX , = x, Y, = y] is a Nash 
equilibrium strategy in the uniform-price transferable COE auction. 
Since the random variables are affiliated, it follows that b*(X) is increasing in X. If  
one interprets X as the profit  margin of  car distributors, then casual empiricism suggests 
that distributors earning larger profit  margins tend to put in higher bids compared with 
distributors selling cheaper makes. I f  X represents a car buyer's willingness to pay, or the 
forecast COE price, it is intuitive that greater urgency to possess a car or higher forecast 
prices will tend to lead bidders to submit higher bids. 
Many people had argued that if an unsuccessful bidder was willing to pay S$I0,000 
for a COE in the resale market,  he or she should have been willing to bid this amount.  
The fact that he or she bid lower than S$10,000 and thereby failed to win a COE seemed 
irrational. In the COE model described here, a bidder's willingness to pay in the resale 
market is influenced by both the realized COE price and other public information released 
after bids were submitted. Hence, the higher price paid in the secondary market merely 
reflects the fact that the bidder's revised valuation of  the COE is now higher. There is 
nothing irrational about  his or her behaviour. 
Nontransferable COE auction 
The question of  forecast asking price, and the ex-post public signal P, are irrelevant 
when COEs are nontransferable.  Unsuccessful bidders have to wait for the next auction 
to try to get a COE. We prove in Appendix A the following two results: 
Proposition 2: b^(x) == v^(x,x) where v^(x,y) m E[V l ]Xj = x, Y) = y] is a Nash equi- 
librium bidding strategy in the uniform-price nontransferable auction. 
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Proposition 3: b*(x) > b"(x), so the COE prices paid by successful bidders in the 
transferable COE auction are higher than those in the nontransferable auction for the 
same set of private information observed by bidders. 
Many people have argued that bids, and hence prices, were higher under transferable 
auctions simply because transferability commands  a premium and therefore bidders were 
willing to bid more for a transferable COE. The line of  argument runs into difficulty in 
the case of  COEs, which have a limited validity period. Generally, a car buyer who bids 
for a COE, or lets the distributor bid for a COE on his or her behalf, has already ordered 
a car with a distributor bid for a COE on his or her behalf, has already ordered a car 
with a distributor to be delivered in the next few months.  The objective of  car buyers 
when they participate in the COE auction is to ensure that they get a COE for their 
vehicle. They have no intention to resell the COE and therefore transferability means 
nothing to them, except if the secondary market  prices are attractive enough to entice 
them to sell their COE (if they are successful), and try again in the next auction. However, 
instances of  this are rare; in fact, it is the car buyers who clamored for COEs to be made 
nontransferable.  
Similarly, car distributors may not be prepared to pay more for transferable COEs, 
because they can always bid by proxy for more COEs (transferable or nontransferable) 
and register cars under the proxies' names and sell the cars later. In fact, this is what 
many car distributors had been doing since October 1991. However,  they may elect to 
obtain extra COEs from the secondary market  and pay the transferability premium (if it 
is small) to avoid tying up the sizable deposit and incurring interest costs (for at least 2 
weeks from the closing date of  the submission to the announcement of  results) when bids 
for COEs are submitted. Most car distributors did not adopt the second strategy; the 
main reason given was a reluctance to be at the mercy of  speculators, who could easily 
corner the market  for COEs in Categories 3 and 4 (where there are only a handful of  
COEs each month),  and dictate monopoly  prices to the car distributors. The Motor  
Traders Association of  Singapore has supported the move to make COEs nontransfer- 
able, indicating that, like car buyers, distributors were also unwilling to pay more for 
transferable COEs (Highway, various issues). 
So what caused prices to be higher for transferable COEs? It is the presence of  the 
speculator. In each COE auction, there will be unsuccessful bidders who do not wish to 
wait until the next auction, even if they expect future COE prices to be lower, because 
they may have deregistered their old vehicles and therefore need a new car desperately; or 
they may not wish to go through the same process of  bidding for a COE and incurring 
additional interest and transaction costs (as well as frustration) in the process. Further- 
more,  when they anticipate that COE prices may increase in future auctions, possibly 
through the release of  additional information in the form of  P, they may decide that 
buying a COE from the secondary market may be the best strategy. Then there are car 
distributors who were unsuccessful and who need additional COEs to complete sales 
agreement with car buyers, who were promised delivery by a certain date. This group of 
unsuccessful bidders who buy COEs from the resale market  are those willing to pay the 
transferability premium to the speculators. 
The biggest speculators in COEs turned out to be the used-car traders. It is not 
difficult to see the attraction of  speculating in COEs for them. For an initial outlay of  
S$40,000, the price of  an average used car in Singapore, a speculator could bid for about 
10 COEs, depositing half the bids with the ROV. If  successful, he or she could sell the 
COEs at a profit  of, say, S$2,000 each, making a total of  S$20,000. This is far more than 
the profit f rom selling a used car. 
With transferable COEs, we argued earlier that bidders must forecast resale prices 
they may have to pay to obtain COEs, should they be unsuccessful. Their forecasts will 
be based in part on past COE prices and other relevant public and private information.  
In general, the higher the COE prices in the past, and the higher the resale prices, the 
higher will be the forecast resale price. Speculators then would have an incentive to put in 
higher bids to push up the COE prices in order that the secondary market 's  perception of 
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resale prices be raised. Since transferable COEs were valid for 3 months, the speculators 
stand to gain by selling the older and cheaper COEs at a profit, if COE prices continue to 
increase. (Of course, they then run the risk that prices may plunge, as was the case during 
the Gulf War.) Informal checks with a few of  the big-time speculators indicated that this 
had been their strategy in bidding for transferable COEs. Not to be outbid, genuine 
bidders (i.e., those who do not intend to resell their COEs) have to raise their bids as 
well, knowing that if they were unsuccessful and have to buy from the secondary market, 
they will have to pay the speculator's price. 
COE transferability and speculation 
Our discussion has focused on the role the speculators play in causing higher bids 
and higher COE prices in a transferable auction, given the same set of  public and private 
information. However, when nontransferability was enforced in October 1991, hopes 
that COE prices would come down did not materialize. As Table 1 shows, except for the 
first few months after the conversion to nontransferability, COE prices continued to 
increase rapidly, reaching all-time highs in the four categories in mid-1992. 
There were several factors involved in the sharp upward trend. First, although COEs 
are legally nontransferable, there is nothing illegal about transferring the COE together 
with the car. This practice of  double transfer essentially implies that COEs are if fact still 
transferable, albeit at a transfer fee of S$I000 to S$2000 for the change in car ownership. 
According to the ROV, approximately 20°7o of the new cars registered since nontransfer- 
ability was put in place were meant for double transfers. The Registry was able to identify 
these cases because the change in ownership took less than a few weeks, sometimes days, 
indicating that the first owner who obtained the nontransferable COE was only a proxy. 
Another contributing factor to the all-time high prices in mid-1992 was the new 
government ruling that from July I, 1992, new cars registered in Singapore must be 
fitted with catalytic converters for the use of  unleaded petrol, to reduce the emission of  
pollutants. This is in line with the government policy of  environmental conservation and 
protection. Not surprisingly, car distributors who have imported cars not fitted with the 
converters were rushing to sell o f f  the cars before July 1992. Many car buyers also 
brought forward their purchases, since cars fitted with the converter are generally more 
expensive. Another factor causing prices for nontransferable COEs to escalate was the 
more intense competition among distributors, which we will discuss in Section 5. 
/ 
COE transferability: 114,'hat's good about it? 
Although transferability, allowing for speculation, has been blamed for the rapidly 
rising COE prices before October 1991, one can argue that the secondary market for 
COEs functions as a useful interim mechanism between auctions, to smooth out demands 
for COEs. As noted in the preceding discussion, unsuccessful bidders may decide not to 
participate in future auctions but pay a little more to obtain a COE from the secondary 
market. There are also smaller car distributors, with less financial resources, who may 
not wish to tie up their funds in the deposit for each submitted bid. Finally, the secondary 
market prices provide an additional source of  information for bidders to forecast future 
COE prices. Therefore, COE transferability does have its merits of  improving liquidity 
and information transmission. 
However, transferability penalises successful bidders who do not intend to sell their 
COEs. This is because these successful bidders are also made to pay the transferability 
premium, which the speculators are prepared to pay and which they can pass onto the 
COE buyers in the secondary market. 
4. THE CASE FOR A DISCRIMINATORY COE AUCTION 
Although successful bidders pay the same price under the current uniform-price 
COE auction, we feel that it is not an equitable system. Wealthy car buyers and car 
distributors with stronger financial backing stand a better chance of winning the COEs, 
compared with less wealthy bidders, since their willingness (and ability) to pay is higher 
40 w. KoH and D. LEE 
and therefore they can afford to put in higher bids. It is partly because of  this concern 
that the government decided that there should be different car categories for the COE 
auction, so that potential buyers are segmented into different car categories. The idea is 
that COE prices in different categories would be vaguely proport ionate to their ability to 
pay. However,  despite this measure, buyers of  more expensive cars (who are presumably 
the better-off  individuals) paid less in COE premium as a proport ion of the car value. 
Apart  f rom speculation, another  argument  put forward for the rapidly rising COE 
prices was that the current system of paying the lowest successful bid encouraged bidders 
to put in arbitrarily high bids, to assure themselves of  a COE, knowing that they would 
probably pay a much lower price if they were successful. The phenomenon is not inconsis- 
tent with our model in Section 3. It implies that some bidders in the COE auction may 
have very high forecast asking prices for COEs if they were successful. Alternatively, 
these bidders may be risk averse, rather than risk neutral, as we have assumed for model- 
ing purposes. The arbitrarily high bids may be an indication of risk aversion. There had 
been suggestions by the public that COE auctions should be made d i sc r imina to ry -each  
successful bidder pays his or her submitted bid. In this way, excessive bidding would be 
deterred. (The government had seriously considered this suggestion in late 1992, when it 
fine-tuned the quota system, but decided not to take it up. See "Government  Fine-tunes 
Car Quota System," The Straits Times, October,  20, 1992, for details.) Next, we discuss 
the case for a discriminatory COE auction. 
COE premium: Road-user charge or property tax? 
First, we address the question, Is the COE premium a charge on use of  road space as 
the government claimed? If it is, the present uniform-price system is efficient and equita- 
ble, since one principle of  equity is that individuals who undertake identical actions (in 
this case, the use of  road space) should be treated equally. 
The COE premium is clearly not a variable road-user charge. There is already the 
road tax in Singapore to carry out this function, and by 1996 the introduction of  the 
electronic road-pricing system will be able to price road usage more efficiently. The COE 
premium is akin to the fixed component  of  a two-part  road user charge, like the access 
charge for telephones in the United States. As such, the COE premium is in fact a 
property tax on an individual's right to own a car and his or her use of  the roads and 
bears no relation to the usage of  road. 
Road space is akin to a public good, which means that the marginal cost of  allowing 
one more car on the road is relatively low as long as road usage is below full capacity. 
Marginal cost is nonzero since an additional car on the road increases pollution levels 
and causes congestion for other car users. On average, road usage in Singapore is still 
below full capacity, calculated by some average measure of  the speed of traffic flow in 
relation to the length of usable roads. I f  road usage is below full capacity, then the 
vehicle quota system is simply a system to ration the right to use roads, and not a user 
charge on the use of  road space. Possession of  this right is determined by how much tax 
an individual is willing to bear. 
The present uniform-price system is highly regressive. Consider, for instance, the 
October 1991 auction (see Table 1), when the COE premium for a luxury car was 
S$12,002. As a percentage of  the OMV, this is about  20°70 for the Mercedes-Benz 
300SE(A) with an OMV of S$62,758. For the small car category, the COE premium is 
S$6300, which is about  55070 of  the OMV for the Toyota  Starlet 1000XL with an OMV of 
S$11,373. The comparison would be even more dramatic  if one looks at the COE prices 
for the September 1992 auction, where the price of  Category 4 (luxury car) COE was 
only S$1,500. 
What the COE prices showed was that in every auction, a less well-off person who 
can only afford a small car paid a higher percentage of  its value in COE premium 
compared with a wealthy individual who could afford a luxury car. The current COE 
auction is therefore a highly regressive tax system, since it penalizes the cheaper cars, 
even though under the system all successful bidders pay the same price. It is generally 
believed that if the government is interested in the social welfare of  the population, then 
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consumption taxes should at least be proport ional  to one's ability to pay, which is indi- 
cated by the value of  the items purchased. Going by this principle, the uniform-price 
COE auction is less desirable, in terms of  welfare implications, to an auction system 
where the premium paid by successful bidders is proport ionate  to their ability to pay. In 
a discriminatory COE auction, successful bidders who bid higher end up paying more. 
Such a system would therefore not favor the rich, as the current uniform-price auction 
does. However, as one anonymous referee pointed out, the situation is not quite as simple 
as that and depends crucially on the demand functions. (See Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980), 
p. 432 for a discussion of the issue.) 
Lower average COE prices 
In a discriminatory auction, bidders would certainly bid lower than their willingness 
to pay, so that if one happens to be the lowest successful bidder, there would still be 
some consumer surplus left. Since each successful bidder pays a different price, it is 
difficult to say in what sense the successful bids are lower than the COE prices in the 
uniform-price auction. However,  we show in Appendix B that if we assume that the 
public information P released after bids are submitted has a small impact on the COE 
resale prices in the secondary market  (following the work of  Bikhchandani & Huang, 
1988), then the expected average COE price for the discriminatory auction is lower than 
the expected COE price in the uniform-price auction, for a transferable COE auction. 
The intuition is that if successful bidders have to pay their own bids, bidders would 
be deterred from putting in excessively high bids; furthermore,  they would have an 
incentive to acquire information and find out what other bidders are willing to pay, to 
place their bids slightly higher than the expected lowest successful bid. In partic- 
ular, speculators would be deterred from submitting high bids to bid up prices and gen- 
erate expectations of  future price increases, since they now have to pay their actual bids 
to do so. 
Besides speculators, car distributors, who offered to subsidize the COE premium as 
part of  their sales strategy, have also been accused of  submitting arbitrarily high bids. 
They had an incentive to do so, since what was at stake for them was not simply the sale 
of  one or two more cars, but the market  share that they could corner in the long term. 
This is because if no car sales were made, distributorships might be replaced, as was the 
case for several car distributorships since the quota system was implemented. Distribu- 
tors, to a large extent, could pass on the COE subsidies to the car buyer by raising car 
prices in the future. (In fact, some distributors thought that the COE auction was a good 
excuse for them to raise car prices.) A discriminatory auction would therefore also deter 
distributors from submitting arbitrarily high bids in their fight for market shares. If they 
have to pay their bids when they are successful, distributors must do more research and 
find out what other car distributors are bidding. It is now not enough to obtain the 
COEs, but to obtain them at as low prices as possible, relative with the prices paid by 
other distributors. 
It is the reduced incentive to submit high bids by speculators and car distributors 
under a discriminatory auction that leads to lower average COE prices being paid by 
successful bidders. In this sense, one could argue that the discriminatory auction is indeed 
a better system, if one is concerned about moderating the rate of  increase in COE prices. 
The discriminatory auction is clearly also allocatively efficient. For the same set of  
private information,  it is obvious that whether the uniform-price auction or the discrimi- 
natory auction is used, the k bidders with the highest private values will win, provided 
they use the optimal bidding strategy in each auction. The COE allocation is identical in 
both auctions. 
Political acceptability o f  the discriminatory auction 
Although the discriminatory auction may be an improvement over the uniform-price 
COE auction in terms of equity, it is unlikely to be politically acceptable. Successful 
bidders may continue to feel unhappy under the discriminatory system because it is plain 
to see they are treated differently, although each bidder presumably placed a bid that he 
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or she is willing to pay. This unhappiness would be compounded if a wealthy successful 
bidder paid a low price for a COE to buy a luxury car, while a less well-off successful 
bidder paid a much higher price to buy a small car (as was the case in the September 1992 
auction when the COE prices for Category 3 cars plunged to S$1,500). Since the political 
acceptability of  any government policy is measured by how it is perceived by the popu- 
lace, the discriminatory auction is unlikely to pass this test. 
One may argue that higher COE prices in the smaller car categories simply reflect 
higher demands in these categories. However,  this implies that the government should 
have given a higher quota for smaller cars, to ease prices in these categories in subsequent 
auctions. Letting the market  decide on the allocation of  COEs therefore does not elimi- 
nate the need by the government to forecast demands for cars in the different categories. 
The categorization of  cars according to capacity is a useful tool to determine quotas and 
control the car population in different categories. A tougher job would be to estimate 
demand correctly so that the resultant COE prices across all categories are perceived as 
equitable. 
A uniform-percentage COE auction: An alternative 
We believe that an equitable COE auction should be a discriminatory one. To make 
it politically acceptable, successful bidders must perceive that they are treated equally. We 
believe that the COE auction could be modified to one where the bids are in percentage of  
the car price that one is willing to pay as the COE premium. Successful bidders pay the 
lowest percentage. In this sense, the system is a uniform-percentage system. The actual 
premium paid would be tied to the value of the car that the successful bidder buys, so the 
auction is at the same time discriminatory. In fact, since the COE premium is a tax, it 
should be a proportional tax, like the ARF and customs duties, which are, respectively, 
150% and 45% of  a car's OMV at present. 
The uniform-percentage system is progressive, since buyers of  more expensive cars 
are presumably those who could pay higher premiums. (A less well-off individual may 
have a greater urgency to own a car, but would have a lower ability to pay. Besides, in 
Singapore, he or she could always turn to public transportation.)  Buyers and car dealers 
of  smaller cars are not discriminated against. Furthermore,  there is no need to have 
different categories since the original intention of  that was to ensure that the premiums 
would be vaguely proport ional  to the value of  the cars. In fact, by doing so again with 
different categories, it becomes harder for speculators or distributors to corner the market 
for COEs in Categories 3 and 4. 
The proposed system is also politically acceptable. Although successful bidders pay 
different amounts  of  premiums, but as a proport ion of  the value of the car they purchase, 
everyone pays the same percentage. There would not be any ill feelings about  paying 
different amounts,  as in the discriminatory auction where bids are in dollar amounts.  
5. THE VEHICLE Q U O T A  SYSTEM AND MARKET COMPETITION 
As mentioned earlier, the uniform-price COE auction favors distributors who sell 
expensive cars. COE premia form a larger proport ion of  the car value for less expensive 
cars compared with the premia for more expensive cars. This is true within each category 
as well as across categories. This has led to a drop in the popularity of  cars with smaller 
engine capacities among buyers. The sentiment among prospective buyers is that given 
the similar amounts paid for the COE premium, those who could afford it would prefer 
to buy a more expensive car, to preserve the resale value. (Singapore is probably the only 
country in the world where a car may appreciate in value, at least up to about 4 years 
old, because of the rising price of  new cars.) Those who could not afford it would drop 
out of  the market.  The consequence has been that the population for Category I is 
gradually eroded while the populations for the other categories have risen, as shown in 
Table 2. 
To limit the loss of  their market  shares, car distributors responded to the situation 
by offering to subsidize as much as 50% to 100% of  the COE price. The ability of  
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Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Aggregate 
Population at 1 May 1990 
Population at 31 December 1991 
dO, 820 164,519 32,529 6,854 244,722 
(16.7%) (67.2%) (13.3%) (2.8%) (100%) 
42,468 168,739 36,723 8,046 255,976 
(16.6%) ( 6 5 . 9 ° 7 0 )  (14.3%) (3.1%) (100%) 
Source: Registry of Vehicles (Singapore). 
distributors to subsidize COE premium clearly depends on their profit margin. For dis- 
tributors of  more expensive cars, their profit margins are usually higher compared with 
those of  the less expensive makes. (The average profit margin is about 80% of  the OMV; 
for some luxury car makes, such as the Maserati, the mark-up could be as high as 300°70.) 
Therefore, when they bid for COEs on behalf of  their customers, these distributors can 
afford to bid much higher than the forecast price. They are usually not worried about the 
higher bids because they know that it is the lowest successful bid they have to pay. Not 
surprisingly, distributors for cheaper cars are feeling the heat from the competition. To 
maintain sales, they must give higher subsidies. 
The substantial COE subsidies given by distributors was not their most important 
concern. Since COEs are crucial to car sales, distributors are concerned about not being 
able to obtain enough COEs. Not only do they lose their market shares, the storage and 
capital costs involved in keeping the unsold cars can be substantial. Since the quota 
system was introduced, several distributorships have been replaced due to poor sales 
performance. In some cases, the distributorships for cheaper car makes have been passed 
on to the distributors for more expensive cars. The cheaper car makes are now no longer 
promoted as vigorously as the more expensive makes. The reason is obvious: The profit 
margins of  cheaper cars have become very unattractive because of  the larger percentage 
of car price paid in COE premium. 
Effects o f  speculation on car sales 
When COEs were initially transferable, many distributors were worried about specu- 
lators cornering the market for COEs. Although the sizable deposit of  half the submitted 
bid deter widespread speculation, big-time speculators (the used-car traders) were not 
deterred. They had access to substantial overdraft  credit facilities to engage in COE 
speculation. A major speculator could easily corner the market. In each auction, the 
number of COEs available in each category is small, not more than a few hundred in 
Categories 1 and 2, and less than a hundred in Categories 3 and 4. A big-time speculator 
only had to obtain enough names as his or her proxies to bid for all the COEs in a 
particular category and corner a good share of  the market by putting in arbitrarily high 
bids. In one instance, the names of  inmates of  an old-folks home were used. This strategy 
worked because the market for COEs is a small market. 
Success stories of  speculators abound. For instance, in April 1991, as reported in the 
local newspaper The Straits Times, one big-time speculator managed to obtain 40 COEs 
in the open category. He paid only S$1,638 for each of  them and sold them at a profit of  
about S$7,000 each, making a total profit of  about S$240,000. Much higher profits have 
been reported by other speculators. Distributors often had no choice but to pay the prices 
demanded by speculators. Otherwise, they would not be able to sell cars in a particular 
category. 
Nontransferable COEs and market competition 
When COEs became nontransferable in October 1991, a large group of  the specula- 
tors dropped out of the market, although used-car dealers continue to speculate in COEs 
through the practice of  double transfers. To see the reduction in speculation, consider, 
for instance, the demand for COEs in Category 1 (small cars) in the few months after 
October 1991. On average, there are about 230 Category 1 COES available in each 
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auction. In May 1991, the maximum number of  bids received was at an all-time high of 
1518 for these COEs. After the implementation of  nontransferability, the numbers 
dropped to 586 in November 91,447 in December 1991, 393 in January 1991, and 380 in 
February 1992. Not surprisingly, the COE premiums fell after October 1991, as a result 
of  the reduction in speculation. 
Although the public has hoped that with nontransferability COE prices would come 
down, this did not happen, as Table 1 indicates. Part of  the explanation is that COEs 
are, in reality, still transferable via double transfers. In fact, many speculators have lately 
resumed the trade in COEs. This is because the practice of double transfer has gained 
acceptance with the public, as car distributors have also resorted to doing so to maintain 
sales. 
Meanwhile, the implementation of nontransferable COEs has also intensified market 
competition among car distributors. This development was not surprising. For distribu- 
tors to survive, especially for those with small market shares, they must sell a minimum 
number of  cars each month to maintain their showrooms and workshops. Also, once 
their customers have given the deposit to purchase a particular make of car with a 
promised delivery by a certain date, a distributor has to honor its promise by obtaining a 
COE on their behalf in time. If a distributor is unsuccessful in obtaining the required 
number of COEs, he or she cannot sell the target number of cars until the next auction. 
Since COEs are nontransferable, distributors cannot purchase COEs in the same category 
from the secondary market. The only possibility is to purchase open category COEs, 
which are still transferable but are limited in quantity. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have sought to survey the rationale, development, and implications of  the vehicle 
quota system introduced in Singapore in May 1990. We have observed that the switch 
from transferable COEs to nontransferable COEs has intensified market competition 
among car distributors; those with stronger financial backing have better ability to main- 
tain their market shares. 
We also observed in our discussions with bidders that there were many instances 
when bidders were uninformed about changes in the number of COEs available in individ- 
ual categories. An example is the lower COE prices in the open category in December 
1991 (compared with the COE price for the luxury car category) and in January 1992 
(compared with the COE price for the big car category). The reason for this was an 
increase in the quota for the open category in these two auctions, but the general public 
was not aware of the increase. Information about quota availability was carried in the 
Chinese newspapers, but not in the English newspapers, a strange situation which we 
cannot explain. Currently, information about the bid distribution in previous COE auc- 
tions is not freely available. Only the press, the television stations, distributors, and a 
few select organizations such as the Motor Traders' Association and the Automobile 
Association of  Singapore have access to information about bid distributions. We believe 
there is also a need to disseminate information about bid distribution to the general 
public. This is in line with our theoretical model of  the COE auction, since with more 
information bidders would be able to make a more accurate forecast of  future COE 
prices and would have a better idea about the bidding strategies of  the other players. 
The vehicle quota system attempts to control road congestion in Singapore through 
controlling the ownership of  vehicles. Clearly, this is a less direct measure compared with 
pricing road usage. A car kept in the garage does not add to road congestion. In fact, the 
Singapore government is currently studying various methods of  electronic road pricing, 
to be introduced in 1996, to achieve a more direct control on road congestion. 
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APPENDIX A 
Proof  of  Proposition 1: Given his asking price d (Y, ,P ) ,  bidder 1 must  choose a bid b to solve 
max II=(b.x) - E[(r'(Y~,P) - b*(Y,))l b >- b*(Yk),X~ = x] 
# 
= E [ E [ ( r ~ ( Y , , P )  - b ' ( Y , ) ) l X , . r d l b  > b ' ( r , ) . X ,  = xl  
= E [ ( v ' ( X t , Y k )  - b * ( Y k ) ) [ b  > b ° ( Y , ) , X ,  = x ]  (AI) 
where Ir '(b,x) is bidder l 's expected consumer surplus. If bidders 2 to n use b*(.). 
I b O ' t l b )  H'(b.x) = { v ' ( x , y )  - v ' ( y . y ) } f , ( y l x )  dy  x"  (A2) 
w h c r e f , ( y l x )  is the conditional density of  Y,. given Xi = x. By strict affiliation, v~(x,y) is increasing in both 
arguments,  so that the intcgrand in (A2) is positive if and only if x ~- y. it follows that bidder l's expected 
consumer is maximised if hc or she sets b so that b * - t ( b )  = x.  i.e. b = b*(x).  This proves b*(.) is indeed the 
optimal strategy for bidder I. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose bidders 2 . . . . .  n use b^(x).  Bidder I chooses a bid b to solve: 
max II"(b,x) , ,  E [ ( V  ~ - b ^ ( Y , ) ) [ b  > b ^ ( Y D , X ,  = xl 
b 
= E I E I ( V '  - v ^ ( Y , , r , ) ) l x . . r ,  l lb  > b ^ ( Y , ) . X ,  = xl  
= E [ ( v ^ ( x , . r , )  - v ^ ( Y , . r , ) ) l  b > b ^ ( r , ) . X ,  = xl (A3) 
where H"(b,x) is bidder I 's expected consumer surplus. If bidders 2 to n use b"(.). 
i 
b^-tlb) 
II"(b.x) = _ { v ^ ( x , y )  - v ^ ( y . y ) } f , ( y l x ) d y  (A4) 
where f k ( y l x )  is the conditional density of  Yk. given Xt. By strict affiliation, v^(x,y)  is increasing in both 
arguments ,  so that the integrand in (A4) is positive if and only if x :> y. Bidder I's expected payoff  is maximiscd 
if he or she sets b so that b^°~(b) = x,  i.e. b = b^(x). This proves that b"(.) is also the optimal strategy for 
bidder I. 
Proof of Proposition 3: From the definition of  b*(.), we have, if I", :# x ÷. 
b * ( x )  = v ' ( x , x )  = E [ r " ( Y ~ . P ) J X j  = x , Y ,  = x] 
= E [ E I V ,  IX,  :~ Y , , Y , . P I I X ,  = x .Y~ = x] 
> E [ E I V ,  IX,  = Y . . Y . . P I J X ,  = x . Y .  = xl  
= E I V ,  IX,  = x . r ,  = x l  = b ^ ( x )  
where the inequality follows from strict affiliation of  X) and the other variables, and the following equality 
follows from the law of  iterative expectations. Intuitively, a bidder is willing to sell his or her transferable COE 
only if X) > Yk- The forecast asking price is higher the higher Xt is. When no resale is possible, a bidder will 
bid as if he or she is the marginal winner, i.e. Xt = Y,. If Y, = x ÷ (of probability zero), the strict inequality 
becomes an equality. 
AP P E NDIX B: DISCRIMINATORY AUCTIONS AND LOWER COE PRICES 
The following proofs are adapted from Bikhchandani and Huang (1988). We shall consider the transferable 
auction, since the results can be extended to the nontransferable auction easily. We assume all winning bids are 
announced. Suppose there exists a common optimal strategy ba(X), in the discriminatory transferable auction. 
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The relevant valuation for each bidder is again his or her f o recas t  asking price. Suppose bidders 2 to n adopt 
the strategy ba. If bidder I submits a bid b and wins a COE. his or her asking price is 
r~(bd~:(b),y] ..... y,,p) zz E[Vzlbd-'(b),ba-'(b (Yl)) ..... fft-l(b( Y~)),P] 
= E[V~Ibd-i(b),y~ ..... Y,,P] 
(AS) 
Conditional on Xt and Y,, bidder l 's  forecast asking price is 
v ~ ( b a - ' ( b ) . x . Y )  ~= E [ r 4 ( b a - t ( b ) . Y t  . . . . .  Y , . P ) I X ,  = x .Y~ = Yl (A6)  
To maximise expected payoff ,  bidder I submits a bid of  b to solve 
Max l I a (b , r )  - E [ ( r a ( b ~ - I ( b ) . Y z  . . . . .  Y , . P )  - b ) l b  >- b a ( L ) . X ,  = xl 
b 
= E [ v 4 ( b ~ - ~ ( b ) , X t . Y ~ )  - b i b  >- b d ( Y D . X t  = x] 
i 
#a-~lO ) 
= ( v d ( b ~ - t ( b ) . x , y )  - b ) f , ( y l x )  dy  (A7) 
w h e r e f , ( y l x )  is the density function o f  Y,, given X~. For b a to be the optimal bidding strategy, it is necessary 
that it be the optimal strategy for bidder 1 when bidders 2 to n are following the strategy and buyers in the 
secondary market believe that all the bidders in the COE auction are using bOLL That  is, when b = ba(.t), we 
must  have 
arlqb,x) 
o = ab Io.o% = {~qx~.x)  - bqx) }  Io<~lx) _ F , ( x l ~ )  + I f [  
~ 8-7-~x ) - v~,(x.x.y)f,(ylx) dy ( A 8 )  
where b a" is the first derivative of b a, F , ( y ]x )  is the distribution function of  Yk. given X~. and via is the partial 
derivative o f  v '~ with the respect to its first argument.  By the law of  iterative expectations, va(x,x ,y)  = E[ V I ].r I 
= x, 1,,, = y]. The solution to b a is 
where 
I* I* h ( u )  b ' t (x)  = va (x . x . x }  - L ( u l x )  d t ( u )  + f * ( u l u )  . ~ d L * ( u l x )  
x* 
L ( u l x )  = exp I - I i  f , ( s l s )  t ( u )  = v a ( u . u . u )  h ( u )  .= If"  v a ( u ' u ' u ) f * ( y l u ) d y  
Without  going through the analysis, the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy for a nontransferable auction. 
is given by b^: 
i , f  b ^ ( x )  = v ~ ( x . x . x )  - L ( u l x )  d t ( u )  x" 
In the nontransferable discriminatory auction, bidder l 's relevant valuation is Vj. Compar ing b" and b~.b a is 
higher than b". the magni tude o f  the difference depends on v~', the responsiveness of  the forecast asking price 
to the submitted bid. 
If the ex-post information P is not too informative about  the resale value of  the COEs,  then the discrimina- 
tory auction generates a lower average COE price compared with the uniform-price auction. The intuition here 
is that less informative ex-post signals encourage speculators in the uniform-price auction to place higher bids 
to signal higher resale prices. 
Lemm,,:  There exists a scalar M :> 0 such that if ar" (y ,p )ap  < M for all y ,p ,  then the discriminatory auction 
generates a lower average COE price. 
Proof:  Since there are n identical bidders, the expected revenue is simply n times the unconditional expected 
payment  by bidder 1. Let R ~ and R a denote the expected revenue under the uniform-price auction and under 
the discriminatory auction, respectively. Then,  
R" = k x E [ b * ( Y ) I X ,  ~ Y,I R ~ = k x E I b S ( Y ) I X ,  ~ Y,] 
The total unconditional expected profits for bidders for the uniform-price auction and for the discriminatory 
auction are, respectively, 
k x E [ V ~ I X  , > Y,I  - R "  k x E [ V ,  I X  , ~ Y,I - R"  
Hence, prior to bidders receiving their private information,  the two auctions are constant-sum games, with 
total payoff  equal to k x E I V j l X  t > Y,I. Let r~(Y,) ~ E[V~IX t  ~" Y , .Y , I .  It is easy to verify E[r" (Y~) IX  ~ 
~" Y~ .Yd  = E[r=(Y~,P)IX~ ~" Y*,Y,I  so that the unconditional expectations E[r~(Y,)]X~ > Y,I = 
EIr~(Y*,P)IX~ > Yd. Hence, 
R ° = k x E [ r " ( Y , ) I X  I ~ Y,] > R ~ = k x E [ b a ( X i ) l X i  > Y,] (A9) 
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since the unconditional expected profit of a bidder in a discriminatory auction is always positive by affiliation. 
Assuming finite support for P. define M = ( R  ° - R ~ ) / ( k ( p "  - p - ) .  By affiliation, a r ' ( y . p ) / a p  >_ O. so that 
by (Ag). r ' ( Y , , P )  > r ' ( Y k , p *  ) - M ( p "  - P )  > r ' ( Y , )  - M ( p +  - p - )  where the inequality follows from 
the assumption of strict affiliation. Thus, 
and 
r " ( Y ~ )  - r ' ( Y , , P )  < (R  ° - R d ) / k  
- b * ( ¥ , )  = - E [ r = ( Y ~ , P ) I  X ,  = Y,,Y~] < ( R  ° - R d ) / k  r ' ( F , )  
Taking expectations of the above expression conditional on X~ -> Y,, gives R = / k  = E [ b ' ( X ~ ) E X ~  ~_ Y,I  > 
R d / k ,  which proves the Lemma. 
